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Emotions and Standing for Animal
Advocates after ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. &
Barnum & Bailey Circus
Jonathan Krieger*

Introduction
A popular perception exists that advocates of animal rights
are irrational or emotional.' Though advocates acknowledge that
emotions motivate their activism, many rely on scientific or
philosophical justifications for animal protection. 2 In fact, many
activists believe that emotions do not "win arguments." 3 This
belief is well-founded in the legal context, as U.S. courts generally
do not recognize claims based on emotional injuries involving
4
animals.
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to
thank the editors and staff of this journal for their guidance and support. I am
grateful to professors Stefan Krieger, Mary Rumsey, and Sonia Waisman for their
insightful readings of earlier drafts of this article.
1. See, e.g., Harold Herzog et al., Social Attitudes and Animals, in THE STATE OF
ANIMALS 2001 55, 60 (Deborah J. Salem & Andrew N. Rowan eds., 2001)
(recounting the perception created by biomedical interests that animal activists are
"at best, emotional Luddites"); Andrew Herrmann, Circus is in Town, With a Chip
on
Its
Shoulder, CHI.
SUN-TIMES,
Nov.
5,
2003,
available at
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-circus05.html (quoting publicist for
Ringling Bros. claiming that activists "use emotional rhetoric in an attempt to
mislead the public").
2. See Julian McAllister Groves, Animal Rights and the Politics of Emotion: Folk
Constructs of Emotions in the Animal Rights Movement, in PASSIONATE POLITICS:
EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 212, 220-23 (Jeff Goodwin et al. eds., 2001). Cf.
HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 58-61 (4th ed. 1999) (surveying movement literature and
finding that most literature is descriptive, assuming that animals have rights
rather than arguing for such rights).
3. See Groves, supra note 2, at 215-26; John A. Fisher, Taking Sympathy
Seriously: A Defense of Our Psychology Toward Animals, in THE ANIMAL
RIGHTS/ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS DEBATE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 227
(Eugene Hargrove ed., 1992) (observing that animal rights proponents distance
themselves from "sentimental appeals to sympathy").
4. See Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases:
Recognizing Pets' Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification,26 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 31, 39-40 (2001) (noting that litigants suing under negligent infliction
of emotional distress statutes under a bystander theory have been "uniformly
unsuccessful"); Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional
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Gaining standing to sue is one area where this lack of
recognition has hindered activists. The issue of standing on behalf
of animals goes to the heart of the inequality between humans and
nonhumans in the law. Because federal statutes preclude an
animal from having standing to sue, 5 humans must bring the suit
on the animal's behalf.6 In order to prove standing, a human
plaintiff must show she or he is injured. 7 Although courts have
found injury to aesthetic interests cognizable for standing
purposes, 8 until recently, no court recognized emotional injuries. 9
In American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA) v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus,10 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia broke new ground by
finding that a plaintiff had standing to sue based on an emotional
attachment to an elephant formerly in his care." This Article will
argue that the ASPCA court's consideration of emotional factors in
its standing analysis is a small but significant step toward
remedying the lack of legal standing accorded to animals. Part I of
this Article will discuss the state of the law regarding standing on
Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a
CompanionAnimal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 69 (1998) (noting that "[h]istorically, owners of
companion animals were denied common law damages for emotional distress and
loss of society for the wrongful deaths of their companion animals..."). A few state
courts, however, have found valid claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress when a companion animal was killed. See infra Part II.A.
5. Two federal statutes frequently used to advocate for animals are the Animal
Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2000), and the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 (ESA), 16 USCS §§ 1531-1543 (2000). The ESA contains a citizen-suit
provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), while plaintiffs seeking to challenge the enforcement
of the AWA use the "right of review" provision of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 USCS § 702 (2003). Actions under the APA require that the injury be
within the "zone of interests" covered by the statute. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 162 (1997). The scope of this Article is limited to constitutional standing.
Courts have applied the same constitutional standing principles regarding other
animal-related statutes. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S.
221, 230-31 n.4 (1986) (suit under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act and the Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act); Ala. Fish & Wildlife Fed'n v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d
933, 934 (9th Cir. 1987) (suit under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act); Animal Lovers
Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 937 (9th Cir. 1985) (suit under the
National Environmental Policy Act); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002,
1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (suit under the Marine Mammal Protection Act).
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst: Standing for Animals, 47
UCLA L. REV 1333, 1359 (2000) (stating that standing is available insofar as it is
granted under applicable statutes). Thus far, Congress has only granted standing
to "persons." Id. at 1335.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infraPart I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
11. Id. at 338.
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behalf of animals prior to ASPCA. 12 Part II will offer legal and
theoretical frameworks for understanding emotions. 13 Part III will
state the holdings of ASPCA.14 Part IV will show that the court
was right to recognize emotional interests, but wrong in
characterizing the injury as aesthetic. 15 It will argue that an
accurate theory of standing based on emotional injury will
acknowledge the voice of advocates, distinguish environmental
standing cases from animal standing cases, and answer several
criticisms made against the aesthetic theory.
I.

Injury in Fact on Behalf of Animals Before ASPCA

A plaintiff must satisfy three requirements to have standing
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution: 1) the plaintiff must
have personally suffered an actual or threatened injury; 2) the
injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant; and 3) a favorable
decision must be likely to redress the injury. 16 Many of the
problems faced by animal advocates in gaining standing are
related to fulfilling the "injury in fact" requirement. The injury in
fact element of standing requires the plaintiff to have a concrete
and particularized interest. 17 By requiring plaintiffs to possess an
actual stake in the litigation, judges can make decisions in specific
contexts and with a realistic appreciation of the impact of the
8
outcome.'
A.

Courts Have Recognized Injury to Aesthetic Interests

In order to establish injury in fact, animal advocates rely on a
theory of aesthetic injury first recognized in 1972 in the Sierra
Club v. Morton19 decision. In Sierra Club, an environmental
advocacy group sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent
a ski resort from being built on land maintained by the National

12. See infra notes 16-49 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 50-78 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 92-145 and accompanying text.
16. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The federal Constitution limits the judicial powers
of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Valley
Forge held that the requirements of injury, causation, and redressability are the
"irreducible minimum" of what the Constitution demands. 454 U.S. at 472.
17. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The Supreme Court
has glossed the injury in fact requirement to mean that an "injury must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. at 560 n.1.
18. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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Forest Service. 20 The Supreme Court recognized that "aesthetic
and environmental well-being" is a cognizable interest, 21 but
denied standing because the plaintiffs produced no evidence that
the resort would affect them personally. 22 The exact dimensions of
what constitutes an aesthetic injury were not delineated in the
majority opinion, but Justice Douglas's dissent imagined possible
plaintiffs and their correspondent interests in using the park for
recreational purposes. 23 The Sierra Club court did not address
24
animals as anything other than part of the environment.
After Sierra Club, litigants on behalf of animals successfully
asserted injury based on government laws and regulations that25
limited plaintiffs' interests in studying and observing animals.
Courts have disagreed, however, as to whether people have
cognizable interests in seeing animal species as a whole or
individually. 26 A related question is whether the context of the
environment in which the animal is observed is relevant to

20. Id. at 729-30.
21. The invocation of general aesthetic and environmental values, without
further explanation, echoes the Court's early dicta that injury may reflect
"aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" values. See id. at 738 (citing Data
Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)).
22. Id. at 734-35. By requiring a personal injury, the Court eschewed litigation
aimed at finding judicial approval to a value preference. See id. at 740.
23. Id. at 744-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Plaintiffs having an interest in an
undeveloped park would include those "who hike it, fish it, hunt it, camp in it,
frequent it, or visit it merely to sit in solitude and wonderment .. " Id.
24. See id. at 728. The majority does not mention animals except to note that the
area in question was designated by Congress as a game refuge. See id. The dissent
quotes Aldo Leopold approvingly: "The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries
of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the
land." Id. at 752 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY
ALMANAC 204 (1949)).
25. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230-31
n.4 (1986) (finding injury when agency action would adversely affect plaintiffs
ability to watch and study whales). Many courts directly associate aesthetic
interests with the act of observation. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992) ("[T]he desire to use or observe an animal species, even for
purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of
standing."); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (plaintiff suffers an aesthetic injury when he sees "with his own eyes"
animals allegedly mistreated); Animal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 504
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that plaintiffs "interest
in not seeing animals mistreated before her very eyes" is sufficient).
26. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 438. In
Glickman, a plaintiff successfully gained standing to sue for aesthetic injuries
resulting from observing mistreated animals on repeated trips to the zoo. Id. The
majority found language of specificity in previous cases to support interests in
particular animals. Id. at 433. The dissent would have limited standing to those
challenging regulations that would decrease the number of members of a given
species. See id. at 447 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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In Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
aesthetic interests.
Glickman,27 the D.C. Circuit court found an aesthetic interest in
The Glickman
viewing animals under humane conditions. 28
dissent criticized the majority's position as too subjective and
emotional, potentially allowing a sadist to sue for insufficiently
inhumane treatment. 29 One scholar also notes the "obvious
oddity" of describing the injury of observing a mistreated animal
30
as an issue of aesthetics instead of one of ethics or morality.
B.

Courts Have Not Recognized Injury to Emotional
Interests

Historically, courts have refused to find emotional interests
in animals cognizable. 31 Courts' reluctance to recognize emotional
injury perhaps arises from the fear that people will claim
emotional injury from knowledge of a perceived unjust act, 32 even

27. Id. at 426.
28. Id. at 438. In a 1979 decision, the D.C. Circuit suggested that humane
considerations might constitute an independent basis for standing, but decided the
case on different grounds. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Glickman, however, misconstrued Kreps as finding that the
court found recognizable interests in injuries to the quality of a viewing experience.
See Aaron Wesley Proulx, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman: A
Common Law Basis for Animal Rights, 29 STETSON L. REV. 495, 515 (1999)
(arguing that the Glickman majority relied on dicta in Kreps). See also Glickman,
154 F.3d at 447 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (contending that the Kreps court was not
clear on what grounds standing was found).
29. See Glickman, 154 F.3d at 448-49 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissent
focused on the finding of aesthetic injury due to inhumane conditions, finding that
"[h]umaneness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder: one's individual judgment
about what is or is not humane depends entirely on one's personal notions of
compassion and sympathy." Id. at 448. Cf. Robert D. Dodson, Rethinking Private
Nuisance Law: Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisances in the New Millennium, 10 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 16 (explaining judicial unwillingness to find aesthetic nuisances
because aesthetic judgments are too subjective). The Glickman dissent also
forcefully criticized the aesthetic injury theory with regard to how such injuries can
be redressed. See 154 F.3d at 453-54 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissent argues
that if an injury is predicated on a person's attitude about the conditions in which
an animal is kept, the court could not possibly anticipate what would meet his or
her taste, and thus redress the problem. Id. at 454.
30. See Sunstein, supranote 6, at 1349.
31. See, e.g., Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (pleading of general emotional injury rejected). See also Humane Soc'y of
the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Humane Soc'y
of the United States v. Clark, No. 84-3630 (D.D.C. July 25, 1986) (finding standing
when the plaintiffs suffered no more than the "emotional distress at the knowledge
that animals and birds are being hunted for sport")). Though the D.C. Circuit
reversed the denial of standing, the court agreed that "mere emotional injuries"
were not cognizable. Id.
32. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1986) (finding that psychological
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though they have little connection to the allegedly illegal action. 33
But even when plaintiffs alleged sufficient firsthand experience
with animal mistreatment to have aesthetic interests injured,
courts have refused to recognize emotional injuries. 34 In 1992, the
Ninth Circuit came closest to acknowledging emotional interests
by finding that plaintiffs' distress from seeing bison killed was a
35
sufficient injury for standing.
Advocates who claimed injury on the basis of interests in
personal relationships with animals were also unsuccessful. In
similar cases brought by the International Primate Protection
League (IPPL) in 1986 and 1990, two circuits rejected the
disruption of a personal relationship with laboratory monkeys as
an injury sufficient to allow standing.3 6 The courts held that, even
if animal welfare laws were to be enforced, no right existed to see
the animals. 37 The Fifth Circuit also distinguished between
consequences from observing disagreeable conduct is not sufficient to meet Article
III standing). But see Karen L. McDonald, Creating a Private Cause of Action
Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 413-16 (arguing that
courts should enjoin activities violating animal cruelty statutes because such
violations offend morality and, in doing so, constitute a public nuisance).
33. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In his Sierra Club dissent, Justice Douglas distinguished between granting
standing for people who actively use an area and those "merely caught up in
environmental news or propaganda." Id.
34. See Hodel, 840 F.2d at 52 (stating that "mere emotional injuries" are not
cognizable when the court later found an aesthetic injury). In Glickman, one
plaintiff pled "aesthetic harm and emotional and physical distress," but the court
only addressed an injury to his aesthetic interest. 154 F.3d at 430, 431-38. The
dissent, however, noted that an injury to someone's sense of humaneness is based
on his or her emotional response. Id. at 449 (Sentelle, J., dissenting.)
35. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1396-67 (9th Cir. 1992).
Whether the court considered psychological injury as part of an aesthetic analysis
or as a separate interest is unclear. A close reading of the case indicates that the
interest being injured was environmental, rather than a humane one. See Proulx,
supra note 28, at 507. The dissent in one D.C. Circuit case would have found
"injury to a plaintiffs sensibilities" for a scientist who pled personal distress at
viewing mistreatment of animals. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy 23 F.3d
496, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., dissenting in part).
36. Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 895 F.2d 1056,
1059 (5th Cir. 1990) rev'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 72, 89 (1991), dismissed, No.
91-2966, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17021, at *7-8 (E.D. La 1992) (deferring to the
Fifth Circuit's analysis on standing); Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for
Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1986).
37. Inst. for BehavioralResearch, 799 F.2d at 938; Adm'rs. of Tulane, 895 F.2d at
1059. In Institute for Behavioral Research, the Fourth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs' relationship with the monkeys was primarily based on the litigation,
despite the fact that the lead plaintiff had a relationship with the animals predating the litigation. Inst. ForBehavioral Research, 799 F.2d at 935-37. The IPPL
apparently sought to avoid a similar fate in Administratorsof Thlane by pleading
that the relationship was "established prior to any previous litigation in related
matters and which continued during such litigation." Adm'rs. of Thlane, 895 F.2d
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decisions that found injury on the basis of interests in wild
38
animals and the case of privately owned laboratory monkeys.
The court reasoned that plaintiffs could "freely enjoy" wild animals
if their cases succeeded, whereas they could not with privately
owned animals. 39 In a 1995 decision, the D.C. Circuit found that
"no court has yet considered whether an emotional attachment to
a particular animal (not owned by a plaintiff) based upon the
animal being housed in a particular location could form the
40
predicate of a claim of injury."
C. Courts Have Rejected Otherwise Cognizable Injuries for
Being Insufficiently Imminent
The injury in fact requirement is not fulfilled if the alleged
injury is insufficiently imminent, even if cognizable interests are
found. 41 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,42 the Court found that
the plaintiffs' past visits to habitats of endangered species "proved
nothing," and that the lack of concrete plans to return to the
43
habitats failed to meet the injury in fact requirement.
Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit rejected standing for a
psychobiologist who claimed that lack of regulations for rats and
mice under the Animal Welfare Act would force her to endure
abuses in future research. 44 Despite the fact the doctor had
witnessed past abuse of the animals, the court found that the
Four years later, in
doctor suffered no immediate injury. 45
Glickman, however, the D.C. Circuit found injury when a plaintiff
previously observed primates in inhumane conditions and had
every intention of seeing the animals again. 46 The United States
at 1059. The Fifth Circuit did not specifically respond to that pleading.
38. Adm'rs of Tulane, 895 F.2d at 1059.
39. Id. at 1059.
40. Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
41. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992).
42. Id. at 555.
43. Id. at 564. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens suggested that plans
might not be necessary if the plaintiff previously visited a habitat. Id. at 584
(Stevens, J., concurring). He characterized the interest as "comparable, though by
no means equivalent, to the interest in a relationship among family members that
can be immediately harmed by the death of an absent member, regardless of when,
if ever, a family reunion is planned to occur." Id.
44. Animal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 at 500. By considering the
"imminence" requirement first, the court did not consider the sufficiency of the
doctor's plea of professional injuries and personal distress. Id. at 504 (Williams, J.,
dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 500.
46. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 430-31 (D.C. Cir.
1998). The plaintiff pled that he planned to visit the animals in "the next several
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Supreme Court, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, 47 also found future plans to visit a river
sufficient in the environmental context. 48 Still, it is not clear
49
whether future plans could succeed where, as in the IPPL cases,
the plaintiffs have no right of access to animals.
II. Emotions in Law and Theory
A.

Emotions in the Law

Scholars increasingly recognize the role emotions play in the
law. 50
The criminal system is most noticeably infused with
emotion: judges instruct juries on the role of mercy in their
decisions; "heat of passion" is a recognized criminal defense; and
certain crimes, such as racially motivated violence, are considered
more disgusting than others. 51 Emotions also play a role in civil
law; for instance, one scholar argues that legislation banning
same-sex marriage reflects a socially constructed understanding
52
that gays and lesbians are incapable of feeling romantic love.
More on point, tort law recognizes damages for emotional distress
53
on the death or injury of a loved one.
One early judicial recognition of emotional interests in
animals was the 1964 decision of La Porte v. Associated
Independents, Inc. 54 In La Porte, the Florida Supreme Court
allowed recovery by the human companion of a dog that was killed
when a sanitation worker threw a garbage can at her. 55 In
weeks." Id. at 30. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions discussed the
imminence of the injury.
47. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
48. See id. at 184-85. The Court found that the conditional nature of the
plaintiffs' statements-that they would use a nearby river if the defendant ceased
discharging pollutants-could not be equated with the "some day" intentions of the
plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife. Id. at 184 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
at 564).
49. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
50. For a brief survey of law and emotion scholarship, see Laura E. Little,
Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 974, 976-79
(2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW, infra note 51).

51. Susan Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW 4, 6 (Susan Bandes ed.,
1999).
52. Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love,
in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 51, at 236.
53. See Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Recovery for Mental or Emotional
Distress Resulting from Injury to, or Death of, Member of Plaintiffs Family Arising
from Physician'sor Hospital's Wrongful Conduct, 77 A.L.R.3D 447 (2003).
54. La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
55. Id. at 268-69.
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rejecting the prevailing market value approach to assessing
value, 56 the court found that "the affection of a master for his dog
is a very real thing and that the malicious destruction of the pet
provides an element of damage for which the owner should
recover."5 7 More recently, in a suit for the tort of outrage, 58 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized the emotional relationship
between a human and her horses as one of love. 59 Some courts
have also recognized emotional relationships between animals and
humans in the context of marital dissolution. 60
Significantly,
however, courts have been very reluctant to recognize a tort for
61
loss of animal companionship.
B. Emotions in Cognitive Theory
Despite instances of emotion in the law, no consensus exists
among scholars as to what exactly constitutes an emotion. 62 One
helpful approach is to consider emotions as having cognitive
content.63 Cognitive theorists argue that emotions reflect beliefs
and value judgments about their objects, specifically those values
that a person finds intrinsic to a complete life. 64 Anger, for
example requires several beliefs: that a person or someone close to
that person was damaged, that the damage is significant, and that
65
the damage was done by someone, probably willingly.
Emotions are shaped by both individual experience and social

56. The dominant approach to estimating the value of an animal is its market
value at death. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Damages for Injuring or Killing a Dog, 61
A.L.R.5TH 635 (2003) (listing cases adopting market value approach).
57. La Porte, 163 So. 2d at 269.
58. Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
59. Id. at 811-12.
60. See, e.g., Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(noting "genuine love" felt by divorced couple for dog).
61. See Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death
Cases: A Survey of Current Court ahd Legislative Action and a Suggestion for
Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 223, 223 n. 60 (2003)
(noting one recent exception to general rule rejecting cause of action).
62. See Bandes, supra note 51, at 10 (stating that "[e]motional theorists have
never come close to agreeing on a definition of emotion; indeed, there seems to be
widespread agreement on the impossibility of finding one").
63. Cognitivists dominate the study of emotions as a philosophical discipline.
See John Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions, 104 ETHICS 824, 824
(1994).
In contrast, feeling-centered theories relate emotions to physical
sensations. Id. at 825.
64. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT 28-30 (2001).

See also

Thomas G. Kelch, The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory of Animal
Rights, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 31 (1999) (arguing that emotions reveal
what is morally valuable).
65. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at 28-30.
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norms. 66 Social norms affect how different emotions are valued, as
well as what are considered appropriate emotional objects. 67 Some
areas of law reflect such normative valuing. For instance, criminal
law relies on the "reasonable person" standard as to when the
emotion of violent anger is acceptable and when it is not. 68 Thus,
emotions can be legally relevant when they are based on
normatively valued beliefs. 69 In addition, emotions can be both
general and concrete, background and situational. 70
Unlike
situational emotions, which occur in particular circumstances,
background
emotions are characterized
by longstanding
71
attachments that are an integral part of one's life.
Many of the terms used to describe experiences with nature
or animals are treated differently in emotional theory than they
are by the courts. For instance, theorists treat pleasure as a
feeling, without independent cognitive content. 72 Pleasure alone is

66. See id. at 140. A cognitive understanding of emotions is not required to
recognize that emotions are, at least partially, shaped by normative values. Id.
But by focusing on the beliefs and experiences underlying emotions, cognitive
theory provides a way to explain differences in normatively shaped emotions. Id.
67. See id. at 157-65. See also AARON BEN-ZE'EV, THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS
189 (2000) (arguing that "emotions are rational in the normative sense of being an
appropriate response in the given circumstances").
Inappropriate emotional
experiences are obviously not limited to instances when they are directed towards
animals. MARY MIDGLEY, ANIMALS AND WHY THEY MATTER 36-37 (1983).
68. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at 162. In the above example, the prohibited
act is not having the emotion of anger but acting on it. Still, a criminal act
motivated by a normatively unacceptable emotional response is treated differently
than one by a normatively acceptable one. Emotions almost always contain
motivational components. Id. at 135.
69. See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of Vice:" Disgust, Bodies, and the
Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 51, at 45 (arguing that emotion-beliefs
based on compelling reasons create a prima facie case for legal regulation).
70. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at 67-71. A single situation may elicit both
general and concrete emotional responses. Id. The grief that follows the death of a
parent includes both judgments about the 'importance and good qualities of the
deceased, as well as the more general idea that the mourner has lost a parent. Id.
at 68.
71. See id. at 71 ("Once one has formed attachments to unstable things not fully
under one's own control, once one has made these part of one's notion of one's
flourishing, one has emotions of a background kind toward them ... that persist in
the fabric of one's life.").
Nussbaum's distinction between situational and
background emotions parallels another theorist's discussion of emotion (e.g., falling
in love) and sentiment (e.g., being in love). See BEN-ZE'EV, supranote 67, at 83.
72. See BEN-ZE'EV, supra note 67, at 65. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at
63 (arguing that pleasure is a feeling or a way of doing something and is not tied to
any emotion). Ben-Ze'ev demonstrates the distinction between emotion and feeling
by comparing sexual desire and sexual pleasure. See BEN-ZE'EV, supra note 67, at
65. While sexual pleasure consists of a pleasant feeling, sexual desire is complex,
containing evaluative and motivational aspects. Id. at 65, 144.
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not an emotion. 73 Theorists also distinguish emotional experiences
from aesthetic ones. Whereas aesthetic experiences are routinely
directed towards inanimate objects, such as a painting, emotional
experiences typically are not. 74 Aaron Ben-Ze'ev demonstrates the
difference between emotional and aesthetic experiences by
differentiating between the character of the love directed toward
animate and inanimate objects. 75 He observes that the love of a
painting lacks many of the features associated with loving another
person, such as the desire for reciprocal feelings and wishes for the
Other theorists hold that
beloved's future development. 76
emotions can attach to abstract objects, 77 but that certain
emotional experiences, such as compassion, can only take sentient
beings as their objects. 78 Emotion theory thus offers a compelling
framework for understanding emotions that is sometimes at odds
with the legal understanding of emotion.
III. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus
79
In ASPCA, a former circus worker named Thomas Rider
alleged that the mistreatment of elephants by Ringling Brothers
80
employees violated a provision of the Endangered Species Act.

73. Pleasure is contained in other emotions, as when it is directed towards
another's misfortune in the German concept of "Schadenfreude." See BEN-ZE'EV,
supra note 67, at 355.
74. See id. at 44-45.
75. See BEN-ZE'EV, supra note 67, at 30. "Inanimate" and "animate" are used
broadly to differentiate agents from non-agents; the object of an emotion must be
an "agent" insofar as it is capable of emotions. Id. This explains why the story of
the financial problems of a particular person has a much greater emotional effect
than that of a large company's collapse. Id.
76. BEN-ZE'EV, supra note 67, at 45. See also ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE
COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS 167 (1988) (stating that the object of love is
normally constrained to an animate being). One thinker argues that, whereas
concern involves abstract principles, sympathy involves particular individuals or
groups. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 229-30. Because attitudes towards ecosystems
are abstract, they cannot be said to be sympathetic. Id. at 245-46 n.8.
77. For instance, Nussbaum finds that emotions can be tied to beliefs about
systematic wrongs. See NUSSBAUM, supranote 64, at 70.
78. A person feeling compassion for an animal, for example, recognizes a common
vulnerability to suffering. Id. at 319. Trees do not suffer similarly (or really suffer
at all). See MIDGLEY, supra note 67, at 91 ("The Golden Rule does not.., seem to
apply to forests."). Nussbaum discusses extending compassion to animals, but does
not discuss it encompassing nature as whole. NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at 317.
79. Other plaintiffs were named in the action, but the court held that standing
can be found on the basis of one plaintiff when all plaintiffs seek the same relief.
ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
80. Id. The complaint alleges an unlawful "taking' of the elephants: "harming,
harassing, and wounding endangered elephants." 2d Am. Compl. at 1-2 (No. 00-
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Specifically, the plaintiff pointed to the beating of elephants with
sharp hooks, keeping them in chains for long periods of time, and
weaning baby elephants from their mothers prematurely. 81 Rider
quit his job with Ringling Brothers because of the mistreatment,
but expressed his desire to visit or work with the elephants again
in another setting. 82 He claimed he could not stand to see the
elephants again in their current setting because he would suffer
"aesthetic and emotional injury" from such a visit.83 Rider sought
an injunction against additional violations, forfeiture of the
elephants, and other relief.8 4 The district court found no standing
under Article III, holding that neither Rider's desire to work with
the elephants nor his emotional unrest with their mistreatment
were sufficient to meet the injury in fact requirement of
86
standing.8 5 Rider appealed.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and found all of
the elements of standing satisfied. 87 The court stated that the
injury requirement of standing is met when a defendant
"adversely affects a plaintiffs enjoyment of flora or fauna, which
the plaintiff wishes to enjoy again upon the cessation of the
defendant's actions." 88 The decision also marked the first time an
"emotional attachment" was recognized as a cognizable interest.
The court drew its rationale directly from the Laidlaw case.
Specifically, the court reasoned that:
A person may derive great pleasure from visiting a certain
river; the pleasure may be described as an emotional

1641).
81. ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 335.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 335-36.
85. Id. at 336. The complaint was dismissed at the pleading stage. Id. The
court considered the case's procedural posture as a ground for distinguishing
ASPCA from Humane Society of the United States v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir.
1995). See ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 338 (considering, in addition to factual differences,
the lesser standard for showing on a motion to dismiss).
86. ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 334.
87. Id. at 338-39.
88. Id. at 337. The court found the general rule to be based on the Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) and Animal Legal
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) cases. See ASPCA,
317 F.3d at 337. The court interpreted Rider's plea of wanting to visit the
elephants to include watching them perform as a member of the public, where he
could detect the effects of the mistreatment. Id. The ASPCA court also analogized
to Laidlaw in finding standing for Rider despite the fact that, as an audience
member, he would likely not view mistreatment on future visits to the elephants.
See id. at 337. Just as the plaintiffs in Laidlaw could not see the pollution but only
its effects, Rider could detect the effects of mistreatment. Id.
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attachment stemming from the river's pristine beauty ....
We can see no principled distinction between the injury that
person suffers when discharges begin polluting the river and
the injury Rider allegedly suffers from the mistreatment of the
elephants to which he became emotionally attached during his
tenure 9at Ringling Bros.-both are part of the aesthetic
8
injury.
Based on its analogy, and with little further analysis, 90 the
court found a sufficient injury on which to base standing. 91
IV. ASPCA Establishes the Foundation for a New and
Better Theory of Injury
There are questions as to whether ASPCA is limited to its
facts or whether it can be used in different contexts. 92 From a
pragmatic perspective, however, advocates should appreciate
ASPCA as adding a new theory of standing. Both precedent and
emotion theory provide bases for articulating and critiquing the
dimensions of the holding and its effect on future animal rights
litigants.
A.

The ASPCA Court Acknowledges the Voice of Advocates

The D.C. Circuit's finding of an emotional attachment
between a human and nonhuman accurately describes the injury
sustained by Rider. Rider pleaded that, during more than two
years of working with the elephants, he formed a "strong, personal
attachment" to them and that he has a "personal and emotional
attachment" with them. 93 Animal advocates should appreciate the
ASPCA court's reiteration of the stated injury, especially in light

89. See id. at 337-38 (citations omitted). The court's invocation of beauty has
historical pedigree. Aldo Leopold included the human-centered trait of beauty,
along with integrity and stability, in formulating the key teaching of his land ethic.
J. Baird Callicott, Animal Liberation:A TriangularAffair, in THE ANIMAL RIGHTS/
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIcS DEBATE, supra note 3, at 43.
90. ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 338. The court found Rider's desire to visit the animals
sufficiently imminent. Id. It also distinguished the facts in ASPCA from those in
Babbitt, where the plaintiffs interest in viewing elephants generally was not
diminished by the loss of an opportunity to see one individual elephant. Id.
Because Rider had an attachment to specific elephants, the opportunity to see other
elephants would presumably not diminish his injury. See id.
91. Id. The court easily found causation between the defendant's alleged actions
and Rider's injury. Id. The court also inferred from the complaint that an end to
mistreatment would change the elephant's behavior, permitting Rider to attend the
circus, and allowing the redressability requirement to be satisfied. Id.
92. While the ASPCA court announced a general principle regarding the
enjoyment of "flora or fauna," it did not assert criteria for finding emotional
attachments in future cases. Id. at 337.
93. 2d Am. Compl. at 6, 7 (No. 00-1641).
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of the law's previous unwillingness to find such emotional injuries
cognizable. 94 The ASPCA court could easily have found an injury
to an aesthetic interest without mentioning emotions, as it did in
previous cases. 95 By using the language of "attachment," the D.C.
Circuit acknowledged Rider's injury on his terms. 96 The court's
use of the complaint language also has a valuable educational
a
effect. Animal activists praise litigation because it allows them 97
chance to educate the public, judges, and government officials.
By recognizing the plaintiffs voice, the court has given advocates
an opportunity to articulate the important message that emotional
relationships with animals are significant in the eyes of the law.
B.

Despite the Court's Misplaced Reliance on Laidlaw,
Emotional Injuries Are Consistent with Rationale
Behind Standing

While the ASPCA court's acknowledgment of advocate
concerns is significant, it will not be of any use, however, if such
concerns are not consistent with the principles of standing.
Though the D.C. Circuit analogized Rider's injury to the one in
Laidlaw,98 the Supreme Court's decision in that case mentions
neither "emotion" nor "attachment."99 In Laidlaw, the Court
examined various individuals' claims that pollution will prevent
them from fishing, camping, swimming, picnicking, and hiking. 10 0
These interests are the same as those aesthetic and recreational
interests recognized long ago in Sierra Club v. Morton.10 1 Thus,
94. See supra Part I.B.
95. See supra Part I.A.
96. One fact slightly undercutting this argument is that Rider's complaint was
likely drafted with the court's holding of Babbitt in mind. The term "emotional
attachment" was used by the D.C. Circuit to deny standing to the plaintiffs there.
See Babbitt, 46 F.3d at 98. The complaint's references to aesthetic interests also
indicate an attempt to explain the injury in terms of Supreme Court and circuit
precedent. See supra Part I.A. This tailored pleading, however, makes it even
more remarkable that the D.C. Circuit did not simply follow precedent, but instead
found a new underlying interest.
97. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 197-201. The persuasiveness of the
framing of an injury in standing cases can influence the effectiveness of public
interest litigation. See Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 931, 936 (1998) (arguing that a human-centered focus in standing for
environmental litigation could better persuade fact finders, members of the
government and media, defendants, and the general public).
98. See supra text accompanying note 89.
99. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 173-95.
100. Id. at 181-83.
101. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. The
ASPCA court characterizes the plaintiffs in Laidlaw as recreational. ASPCA, 317
F.3d at 336-37.
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both the context (a circus) and the underlying injury (an emotional
one) make ASPCA novel.
Nonetheless, emotional injury, viewed in light of emotion
theory, is consonant with previous teachings on standing. Injury
in fact focuses on personal and individual harm,10 2 and emotions
are intensely personal, implicating values that a person finds
intrinsic to a complete life.103 Additionally, courts' previous
rejection of emotional injuries can be reconciled with ASPCA by
the notion of normative valuing of emotions. 04 Whereas emotional
injuries related to knowledge of violations of a law from afar are
not normatively construed as constituting legal injury, those
relating to firsthand experience of violations can claim injury.105
The distinction between background and situational emotions
also explains why ASPCA is consistent with previous cases
By requiring an "emotional
rejecting emotional injuries.10 6
attachment," the court has implicitly rejected those plaintiffs
If an
whose emotional responses are merely situational. 10 7
attachment means that an object must become part of the fabric of
one's life, it is not surprising that courts have recognized
emotional attachments with animals in the two places where most
humans spend their lives: at work (in ASPCA) and at home (in
the companion animal tort cases and in marital dissolution
cases). 108

102. See supra note 17.
103. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 69 and text accompanying notes 68-69.
105. See supra notes 32-33. The D.C. Circuit has found aesthetic, but not
emotional, injury when a plaintiff had firsthand experience of a violation. See
United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In that case, however, the
court construed the emotional claim to be in reaction to poor enforcement of
environmental laws, not in reaction to the dead animals that helped constitute the
aesthetic injury. Id.
106. See supra note 71.
107. See supra notes 33, 71.
108. This requirement of attachment also provides a better explanation of why
the Animal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994), case was
dismissed. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Given the mechanistic
approach to pleading since Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 560 (1992), the
doctor's claim that she would be required to engage in future research should have
met the imminence component of injury. See Animal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy,
23 F.3d 496, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., dissenting in part). A better way to
distinguish Espy from ASPCA is that the Espy plaintiff did not plead a personal
attachment to one animal or group of animals. Id. at 496-504. This view, which
ASPCA appears to adopt, limits a cognizable emotional object to an individual,
rather than a species. The court's invocation of Laidlaw, though misguided as to
the nature of the injury, vindicates the notion that the particularity of the object is
crucial to meeting the injury requirement of standing.
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By limiting the cognizable objects of emotion and requiring
an emotional attachment, ASPCA should allay fears that allowing
emotions to provide standing would greatly expand the pool of
Even if all the people who work with animals
litigants. 0 9
regulated by federal statutes could potentially become plaintiffs
under the ASPCA theory of standing, each would have to allege
emotional attachments to individual animals. This formulation of
emotional injury would likely exclude plaintiffs who witness one
instance of animal mistreatment or are emotionally injured by
viewing the products of animal industries." 0 Instead, ASPCA
empowers those whose knowledge and experience with animals
makes them the best spokespersons for eliminating or reducing
their suffering."'
C. ASPCA Highlights the Inappropriatenessof
Environmental Theories of Standing in Some Animal
Cases
The ASPCA court's characterization of Rider's suffering as
"part of the aesthetic injury"112 undercuts the power of its finding
of emotional attachment as a cognizable interest. Like courts
before it, 1 3 the court considered animals as part of nature, finding
interests in the "enjoyment of flora or fauna" and analogizing the
viewing of the pollution of a river with the viewing of
But, by the court's own terms,
mistreatment of animals." 4
pollution and mistreatment implicate different values; pollution
offends the "pleasure" of "pristine beauty,"' 5 while mistreatment
offends a sense of humaneness. 116 Considering the theoretical
109. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-52; supra note 33 and
accompanying text. The ASPCA court acknowledges the novelty of its holding
regarding emotional attachment by contrasting it with Valley Forge. ASPCA v.
Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
110. In this way, the Ninth Circuit's recognition of interests in not seeing the
killing of wild animals (with whom the plaintiffs presumably had no prior
attachment) could reach a different pool of plaintiffs than ASPCA. See sources
cited supra note 35 and accompanying text. In the absence of knowledge of a
species, however, claims based on viewing animal mistreatment have a greater
chance of being denied. See infra note 140.
111. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[t]hose people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water.
. .must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are
threatened with destruction").
112. ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 338.
113. See supra note 24.
114. See supra Part III.
115. ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 338.
116. See id. (stating that viewing inhumane treatment of elephants is the source
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distinction between pleasure and emotion, a person's pleasure at
viewing a certain object does not always involve an emotional
In the absence of underlying judgments, the
experience. 117
pleasure of viewing a river, or, in some cases, an animal,118 then
can be best categorized as aesthetic.1 1 9
It could be argued that the Laidlaw plaintiffs' reaction to the
pollution involves the claim that waterways are best enjoyed when
kept in pristine condition.1 20 This claim appears to be a matter of
preference rather than a judgment related to one's life. 121 In
contrast, animals can be distinguished from nature as a whole
because they are capable of emotions, a key attribute that allows
them to be more than a mere aesthetic object. 122 This conclusion
does not imply that all interests in animals are emotional ones or
that humans cannot have cognizable aesthetic interests in
An aesthetic interest in an animal still seems
animals.
appropriate when the injury affects seeing an animal in its native
habitat. 23 In such a situation, the interest in viewing the animal
would be akin to the pleasure in viewing a waterfall.' 24 In
of Rider's aesthetic injury).
117. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
118. That would be the case when animals are construed of as part of nature, i.e.,
as part of a scene. See infra text accompanying notes 123-124.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. A river is not an agent and thus
viewers cannot compare its situation to the human situation. In the absence of
agency, something cannot be an emotional object. See supra note 75.
120. The averments made by the plaintiffs in Laidlaw concern injury to
plaintiffs' recreational interests-activities that are avowedly human-centered. See
supra text accompanying note 100. Some environmentalists might argue that the
plaintiffs felt disgust, containing the belief that rivers should not be polluted,
regardless of whether humans use them. Such a claim would complicate the
distinction between animate and inanimate objects made by cognitive theorists.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. Even if the underlying judgment
accorded intrinsic value to nature as a whole, however, it would likely contain
different judgments than those involving animals.
121. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. See also Humane Soc'y of the
United States v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 99 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (characterizing
aesthetic interest in seeing an animal in one place rather than another as a
"preference"). The preference of one view over another-here, a pristine view
instead of a polluted view-lacks dimensions beyond the experience itself. See
Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 209-12,
245 (1974) (arguing that natural beauty's only value is the pleasure it produces and
that it is usually more pleasurable to exploit than to preserve). The personal injury
requirement of standing cannot be met by litigants merely seeking support for their
value preferences. See supra note 22. If a pleasurable experience is different than
an emotional one (based on underlying humane judgments), the Glickman dissent's
analogy between the two is wrong. See supra note 29.
122. See supra note 75.
123. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4
(1986).
124. Cf. MIDGLEY, supra note 67, at 90 ("Our duties to swarms of very small or
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Humane Society of the United States v. Hodel, 125 plaintiffs were
successful in gaining standing when a regulation would have
forced them to witness animal corpses.1 26 A plaintiff would not
succeed on similar facts under an ASPCA theory, because they
likely would not be able to prove an attachment. The unpretty
picture created by hunting offends aesthetic interests. Such a
construction undoubtedly denies the agency of wild animals,
putting them on the aesthetic level of inanimate objects. 127 But by
recognizing that people treat domestic and nondomestic animals
differently, and thus sustain distinct injuries involving them,
animal advocates could argue standing based on observation in
two ways, depending on the context of the mistreatment.
D. A Theory of Emotional Injury, Unlike an Aesthetic
Theory, Could Be Objectively Evaluated
The dissent in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman
argued that aesthetic injuries depend too much on individual taste
and could potentially justify standing based on a plaintiffs
interest in inhumane treatment. 128 Emotions, like aesthetics, do
indeed depend on the individual; it is precisely the personal nature
of emotions that makes emotional injuries so appropriate for
determining injury in fact. 129 Judgments about beauty, however,
have a certain superficial quality, which makes their attempt at
normative assessment arbitrary. 130 In contrast, emotions contain

distant animals, or to whole species, seem to be partly of the ecological sort,
resembling in many ways our duty to plants.. ").
125. 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
126. Id. at 52.
127. But see Calicott, supra note 89, at 52 (arguing that domestic animals are
"living artifacts").
128. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 448-49 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The majority's response, that only aesthetic
interests that are "legally protected" by statutory authority or policy, confuses
Id. at 448-50 (Sentelle, J.,
prudential and constitutional standing tests.
dissenting).
129. See supratext accompanying notes 102-103.
130. Decisions based on aesthetic responses to animals would likely produce
absurd results. An injury based on an emotional response to cruelty (e.g., that a
social animal, such as a chimpanzee, should not be isolated) seems consistent with
a public policy concern-namely, that cruelty to animals should be minimized. An
injury based purely on aesthetics (e.g., that orange is a better color than black to
paint a chimpanzee's cage) would be devoid of such public policy concerns. Some
courts hearing nuisance cases have, however, evaluated aesthetic injury in a
normative manner. See Dodson, supra note 29, at 19-20. In those decisions, the
aesthetic inquiry is whether an "unaesthetic land use is reasonable in its location
and surroundings." Id. at 20. The aesthetics of a particular viewing of an animal,
especially outside of nature, lacks a similar context.
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judgments that can be evaluated normatively.1 31 Both the ASPCA
court and companion animal tort and divorce cases recognize the
normative value of emotional attachments between humans and
animals. 132 The attachment between two creatures can be judged
in specific normative terms. A court could consider, for instance,
the length of the relationship, the number of visits, and how recent
33
the visits had been.
One could alternatively argue that a sadistic plaintiff does
not simply prefer a sadistic view, but that she or he suffers from
an emotional injury containing beliefs that animals should be
treated cruelly. 134 That plaintiff would still not necessarily
succeed under the ASPCA theory. Just as courts find that violent
anger is a legally appropriate response to a punch in the face but
not a less threatening attack, courts could find that a positive
emotional attachment, but not a negative one, could form the basis
for standing. 35 The court's recognition of one emotion does not
necessarily require finding standing on the basis of another.
Though society has found value in protecting animals from
mistreatment, most notably through anti-cruelty laws, no
legislature has advocated animal cruelty,' 36 By rejecting a sadistic
131. See supra note 69 and text accompanying notes 68-69. See also Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183-84 (2000) (finding
cognizable interests based on "reasonable concerns" of plaintiffs regarding pollution
of river). A theory of standing based on emotional injury also withstands the
criticism leveled at aesthetic injury with regard to the redressability requirement.
See supra note 29. Consider an animal welfare suit where the plaintiff pled
emotional injury based on an attachment to a dog being tested in a government
laboratory and contended that $75,000 would redress his problem. The court would
look to the judgment contained in the emotion (regarding the importance of the dog
to the plaintiffs life and the dog's suffering) and deny standing on the basis of
redressability. If a person saw an animal as truly part of the fabric of her or his
life, a cash payout would not normatively redress the problem of the person's
suffering on behalf of an animal's continuing suffering. The biblical story of King
Solomon's decision in the case between two mothers claiming a baby follows a
similar logic. See 1 Kings 3:16-27. If the lying party had truly felt love for the
child, the remedy (splitting the baby) would not normatively redress her claim to
being the mother.
132. See supra Parts II.A, III.
133. The ASPCA court, for instance, acknowledges that Rider worked for more
than two years with the circus. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey
Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
134. A plaintiff with inhumane interests could establish a relationship with an
animal through repeated visits as well as a plaintiff with compassionate interests
could.
135. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
136. Despite the low priority generally accorded to animals rights vis-6-vis other
issues, researchers for the Humane Society of the United States found that
Americans have a much greater concern for animal research when it caused pain or
death. See Herzog et al., supra note 1, at 58, 63. Two polls from the early 1990s
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plaintiff, the courts would be following pre-existing public policy.
The court's requirement of an emotional attachment, rather
than a situational emotional interest, 137 further supports the
possibility of an objective assessment of emotions involving
animals. In both Glickman and ASPCA, the courts acknowledged
the plaintiffs' experience with mistreated animals. In Glickman,
the court recognized the plaintiffs past experience with animal
relief organizations and that his injury at viewing an isolated
chimpanzee stemmed from his knowledge that chimpanzees are
social animals.138 In ASPCA, the court noted the length of Rider's
working relationship with the animals and that the elephants
showed "stereotypic" stressful behavior. 139 If any emotion were
cognizable, the court could have simply held that Rider had
suffered an emotional injury without recounting the context within

which he experienced it. By taking into account that some
plaintiffs have particular knowledge and experience, the court
evaluated the reasonableness of the underlying judgments
constituting the emotion.140

E. An Injury Theory Based on EmotionalAttachment
Would Providea More RealisticApproach to the
Requirement that an Injury Be Imminent
Since Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, plaintiffs in animal
rights cases have specified their future plans to visit a mistreated
animal in order to meet the injury requirement of standing.1 41 The
requirement that a plaintiff plans to visit again appears to be
based on the longstanding connection courts have found between
aesthetic interests and the act of observation. 42 But if Rider
indeed has a personal attachment to elephants and knows they are
being mistreated, he is surely sustaining a current injury. In his
found Americans felt that the pain and suffering of farm animals should be reduced
as much as possible (even when animals were going to be slaughtered anyway) and
that it was worth it to spend more money to ensure humane treatment. Id. at 65.
137. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
138. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
139. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 335
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
140. A theory allowing any perceived wrong to an animal to constitute standing
would be overprotective. For instance, a person might object to a zoo's python
having not eaten in over a year, not realizing that that is the natural eating
pattern of that snake. See MIDGLEY, supra note 67, at 38. The propriety of a given
emotion is best determined by "intelligent, informed observation." Id.
141. See supra Part I.C.
142. See cases cited supranote 37.
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concurring opinion in Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Stevens argued
that an injury could be immediate without future plans,
analogizing the situation to the injury sustained when a family
hears of the death to a relative, regardless of whether a family
reunion was in the planning. 143 Under such a view, Rider's
current emotional injury would be cognizable without pleading
future plans.
This view of the injury requirement would be of particular
advantage to advocates suing to protect animals not on public
exhibition. 144 In the context of a private laboratory, or even a
scrutinizing zoo or circus, a plaintiffs lack of ability to revisit could
be fatal under the current imminence requirement.1 45 Someone
could presumably sustain an injury similar to Rider's, but be left
without standing to sue. If courts were to adopt a standing
requirement that accurately accounts for the injuries involved
when humans form attachments to particular animals, like
injuries could be treated alike, regardless of formulaically pled
plans.
Conclusion
By recognizing that some emotions "win arguments,"1 46 the
court in ASPCA implicitly criticized those who would reject
emotional interests in animals as irrelevant in the legal context.
The court's finding of injury based on emotional attachments to
animals, whatever its flaws, provides the foundation for a more
workable, honest, and compelling theory of standing. The ASPCA
basis for standing, even as understood in light of emotion theory,
Advocates without an attachment to an
has its limitations.
1 47
animal, for instance, would not be able to allege standing.
Nonetheless, if future litigants use ASPCA as a starting point,
they can both succeed in gaining standing and in advocating for
their cause.

143. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 584 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
144. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
146. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
147. In the case of a wild animal, though, they could still allege aesthetic injury.
See supra text accompanying notes 123-127. Additionally, litigation in other
venues based on situational emotions might be successful. See supra notes 35 and
110 and accompanying text.

